Archive for the ‘Research Day’ Category

NCAA Football: Offensive Lethality

January 10, 2009

NCAA 2008 Offensive Lethality

Points divided by Time of Possession; that is, points scored per minute (PPM) of offensive possession.

Team Off. TOP Points PPM
Oklahoma     409.66 716        1.75
Oregon     325.47 545        1.67
Missouri     367.21 591        1.61
Tulsa     412.68 661        1.60
Houston     352.18 528        1.50
Florida     418.94 611        1.46
Texas Tech     391.39 569        1.45
Rice     398.71 537        1.35
Oklahoma St.     402.59 530        1.32
Boise St.     372.22 489        1.31
Texas     420.68 551        1.31
Kansas St.     330.06 419        1.27
Penn St.     410.13 506        1.23
Southern California     400.86 488        1.22
Nevada     423.27 489        1.16
Ball St.     423.81 489        1.15
Utah     418.10 480        1.15
Arizona     415.94 476        1.14
Troy     375.45 426        1.13
BYU     393.11 445        1.13
California     376.09 424        1.13
Kansas     393.11 434        1.10
La.-Lafayette     371.42 397        1.07
Mississippi     390.74 417        1.07
UTEP     371.02 395        1.06
Florida St.     408.40 434        1.06
Nebraska     439.64 460        1.05
LSU     390.53 402        1.03
North Carolina     350.68 360        1.03
Georgia     400.00 409        1.02
Western Mich.     364.68 372        1.02
Baylor     333.05 336        1.01
Akron     358.50 360        1.00
Southern Miss.     396.56 398        1.00
Central Mich.     385.36 384        1.00
Fresno St.     386.43 385        1.00
Illinois     350.15 344        0.98
Buffalo     432.86 424        0.98
Iowa     407.33 394        0.97
TCU     454.50 437        0.96
Oregon St.     414.65 397        0.96
Rutgers     396.56 377        0.95
Alabama     447.24 422        0.94
Bowling Green     353.13 332        0.94
Miami (Fla.)     380.83 352        0.92
Fla. Atlantic     357.57 326        0.91
South Fla.     396.77 359        0.90
Cincinnati     401.31 362        0.90
Texas A&M     333.24 300        0.90
Florida Int’l     328.87 296        0.90
Wisconsin     398.93 357        0.89
Kent St.     347.56 308        0.89
UNLV     349.95 307        0.88
Ohio St.     409.70 359        0.88
Stanford     359.69 315        0.88
Navy     405.82 353        0.87
Pittsburgh     405.39 352        0.87
Clemson     378.03 327        0.87
Air Force     403.02 348        0.86
Louisiana Tech     371.79 320        0.86
Temple     327.08 281        0.86
Northwestern     371.35 317        0.85
West Virginia     375.45 319        0.85
Utah St.     342.79 288        0.84
Memphis     423.91 353        0.83
Iowa St.     367.05 304        0.83
Purdue     357.50 296        0.83
Arkansas St.     391.70 324        0.83
Michigan St.     400.86 326        0.81
SMU     315.55 256        0.81
Hawaii     425.44 345        0.81
Georgia Tech     394.40 317        0.80
Boston College     430.77 346        0.80
Ohio     360.88 289        0.80
Toledo     336.62 269        0.80
Arizona St.     343.98 274        0.80
North Carolina St.     383.20 305        0.80
Notre Dame     404.31 321        0.79
Colorado St.     412.50 327        0.79
Middle Tenn. St.     345.77 274        0.79
Connecticut     409.91 324        0.79
Eastern Mich.     391.30 309        0.79
Maryland     359.08 283        0.79
Louisville     376.99 296        0.79
Minnesota     387.73 302        0.78
Kentucky     380.62 294        0.77
East Carolina     426.36 328        0.77
Indiana     320.12 246        0.77
New Mexico St.     348.36 266        0.76
La.-Monroe     372.61 284        0.76
Northern Ill.     413.14 314        0.76
Marshall     332.25 246        0.74
San Diego St.     312.96 231        0.74
Michigan     329.86 243        0.74
UAB     373.21 273        0.73
Arkansas     363.07 263        0.72
South Carolina     383.85 270        0.70
Colorado     345.37 242        0.70
New Mexico     362.47 253        0.70
Wake Forest     394.62 273        0.69
Virginia Tech     459.31 309        0.67
Syracuse     325.09 217        0.67
Duke     362.08 241        0.67
North Texas     365.85 240        0.66
Idaho     362.47 235        0.65
Vanderbilt     385.57 249        0.65
San Jose St.     350.15 224        0.64
Tennessee     340.60 208        0.61
Miami (Ohio)     365.85 221        0.60
UCF     331.65 199        0.60
UCLA     359.29 212        0.59
Virginia     332.25 193        0.58
Auburn     360.29 208        0.58
Tulane     373.61 200        0.54
Mississippi St.     360.88 183        0.51
Army     378.78 177        0.47
Washington     347.96 159        0.46
Wyoming     346.37 152        0.44
Washington St.     378.68 165        0.44

Research Day: Can Bin Laden Win?

July 20, 2007

CCCP PropagandaAs a young man, Osama Bin Laden studied economics at the Management and Economics School of King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah. At age 23 he joined fellow hardcore Sunni Islamists, unwelcome in Saudi and Egypt, in a virtual pilgrimage to Afghanistan to oppose the Soviet invasion.

Within two years of his arrival he and his fellow mujahadeen were receiving (indirectly, through Pakistan) Saudi and American arms and money. Within four years of his arrival he was heading up the Maktab al-Khadamat, actually handling the logistics of the guerilla war against the Soviets. Shortly thereafter he began to assume operational command of guerilla forces. Six years after his arrival in Afghanistan, in 1987, he won: The Soviet retreat began. It could not have escaped his notice that, just months after the withdrawal concluded in 1989, the entire Soviet Union began its abrupt collapse.

As illustrated in 1813 and 1944, The Russians have a tradition of absorbing and overcoming galling loss of life in their military endeavors. By this standard, the Afghanistan conflict was mild: all told, the Soviets lost just 15,000 dead and 53,000 wounded. The Soviets didn’t abandon the field because of the bloodshed. Nor could they be accused of not trying hard enough: Soviet generals killed an estimated 1,000,000 Afghanis. The Soviet withdrawal is better understood, and the 30-something former economics student probably understood it this way, as a matter of dollars and cents.

The Soviets kept between 80,000 and 100,000 soldiers and support troops stationed in Afghanistan throughout their occupation. The cost of maintaining this occupation is estimated to have cost the Soviets dearly; military spending accounted for 15-16% of their GDP by the mid-1980s, and in 1984 they budgeted another 45% increase in their five-year plan. They lost hundreds of planes, more than 100 helicopters, more than 100 tanks, thousands of vehicles and artillery pieces, plus they burned through loads money trying to prop up a puppet government and train a pet Afghan army.

Bin Laden would have watched the Soviets flee and collapse, and felt pride in his role. You can argue that the Soviet Union collapsed because of slowing growth, demoralization, weakening oil prices, Ronald Reagan’s defense spending… whatever, there’s some truth in all of that. It’s impossible to think, though, that from his perch on the roof of the world, Bin Laden wasn’t convinced, rightly, that by harnessing jihadist guerillas he helped bring a superpower to its knees.

The funny thing is, I distinctly recall Bin Laden explaining exactly how he intended to defeat the US (sound of me rummaging on Google) back in 2004. Here’s an awkwardly translated Bin Laden quote :

“Al-Qa’ida spent $500,000 on the event [9/11] while America lost in the event and its subsequent effects more than 500 billion dollars; that is to say that each of Al-Qa’ida’s dollars defeated one million American dollars, thanks to Allah’s grace. This is in addition to the fact that America lost a large number of jobs, and as for the [federal] deficit, it lost a record number estimated at a trillion dollars.”

We know his history. He’s showing us his playbook; he targeted the World Trade Center, for heavens sakes. The only way we can lose is if we spend our way into a macroeconomic hole; which is what we’re doing. It’s embarrassing, is what it is. The United States is burning almost $3 billion per week in Iraq alone; big picture, we’re blowing at least 20% of our federal budget (4.3% of GDP) on military spending (<–corrected; earlier version of this post read “20% of GDP). The indirect costs–in terms of security lines, gas prices, poorly allocated resources, international prestige–defy calculation.  We are piling up debt with no new investments in infrastructure or education to show for it, and a record 44% of that debt is now held outside of the United States.

We don’t take Bin Laden seriously enough. He’ll be glad if we leave Iraq, but unsatisfied. For a true, Soviet-style victory, he needs us to continue hemmorhaging blood and treasure in a futile conflict on foreign soil.

Sources (partial):

http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1994/04/01/000009265_3961006063138/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bin_laden

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/apers/borrowing.pdf

Research Day: Yankees or Mariners?

June 24, 2007

Winning Run, 1995 ALDSI know this guy Pete, and today Pete made a claim: The 1995 Mariners were much, much better than the 1995 edition of his beloved Yankees. It’s no wonder, stocked with all that talent, that the Mariners won the series. Sounds like a job for a Research Day.

The following is the Mariners’ roster from 1995, listing the position players who most frequently played that position and their stats for that year.

  •  Position Player, Games, AVG, OBP, RBI, HR
  • C Dan Wilson, 119 games, .278, .336, 51, 9
  • 1st Tino Martinez, 141 games, .293, .369, 111, 31
  • 2nd Joey Cora, 120 games, .297, .359, 39, 3
  • 3rd Mike Blowers, 134 games, .257, .335, 96, 23
  • SS Luis Sojo, 102 games, .289, .335, 39, 7
  • LF Rich Amaral, 90 games, .282, .342, 19, 2
  • CF Ken Griffey Jr., 72 games, .258, .379, 42, 17
  • RF Jay Buhner, 126 games, .262, .343, 121, 40
  • DH Edgar Martinez, 145 games, .356, .479, 113, 29

Position player summary: The Mariners field a team with Two First Ballot Hall of Fame Locks (Griffey, Alex Rodriguez), a near-Hall-of-Famer at the apex of his power (Edgar), and two outstanding not-Hall-of-Fame players in Buhner and Tino. Rodriguez is on the roster, but for our purposes he doesn’t count (he played in 54 games at AAA-Tacoma in 1995, and only 48 games on the Mariners’ roster, batting .232–with only one plate appearance against the Yankees). So: 1 Hall of Fame lock, 1 near-Hall of Famer, 2 great players, and a solid supporting lineup of .280/.290 hitters.

  • Pitcher, Games, ERA, W
  • Randy Johnson, 30 games, 2.48, 18
  • Chris Bosio, 31 games, 4.92, 10
  • Tim Belcher, 28 games, 4.52, 10
  • Salomon Torres, 16 games, 6.00, 3
  • Andy Benes, 12 games, 5.86, 7
  • Bullpen/Closer: Bobby Ayala, 63 games, 4.44, 19 saves
  • Bullpen/RH: Jeff Nelson, 62 games, 2.17,  7 wins
  • Bullpen/RH: Norm Charlton, 30 games, 1.51, 2 wins

Pitcher summary: The Mariners pitching staff has one First Ballot Hall of Fame Lock, Randy Johnson. The rest of the starting staff had ERAs at or above 4.50. The bullpen had two rock-solid relievers in Charlton and Nelson, but the closer was Bobby Fucking Ayala.

And the Yankees?

  •  Position Player, Games, AVG, OBP, RBI, HR
  • C Mike Stanley, 118 games, .268, .360, 83, 18
  • 1st Don Mattingly, 128 games, .288, .341, 49, 7
  • 2nd Pat Kelly, 89 games, .237, .307, 29, 4
  • 3rd Wade Boggs, 126 games, .324, .412, 63, 5
  • SS Tony Fernandez, 108 games, .245, .322, 45, 5
  • OF Bernie Williams, 144 games, .307, .392, 82, 18
  • OF Paul O’Neill, 127 games, .300, .387, 96, 22
  • OF Gerald Williams, 100 games, .247, .327, 28, 6
  • DH Ruben Sierra, 56 games, .260, .322, 44, 7

 First, three guys sat on the Yankees’ bench in 1995: Derek Jeter, Darryl Strawberry, and Jorge Posada.  Leaving them aside, the Yankees had one Hall-of-Fame player (Boggs) and three near-Hall-of-Fame players (Mattingly, O’Neill, and Bernie Williams) among position players. Their bottom-of-the-lineup guys sucked compared to the Mariners.

  • Pitcher, Games, ERA, W
  • Jack McDowell, 30 games, 3.93, 15
  • Sterling Hitchcock, 27 games, 4.70, 11
  • Andy Pettitte, 31 games, 4.17, 12
  • David Cone, 13 games, 3.82, 9
  • Scott Kamieniecki, 17 games, 4.01, 7
  • Bullpen/Closer: John Wetteland, 60 games, 2.93, 31 saves
  • Bullpen: Bob Wickman, 63 games, 4.05, 2 wins
  • Bullpen: Steve Howe, 56 games, 4.96, 6 wins

This is a much sounder starting pitching lineup than Seattle’s, featuring one likely Hall-of-Famer in Andy Pettitte, two Hall-of-Fame vote-receiving pitchers in McDowell and Cone, and, overall, four starters with ERAs sub-4.17. Interesting side-note: First Ballot Hal of Fame Lock Mariano Rivera is struggling to break into the starting lineup, with a 5.51 ERA. Wetteland is a way better closer than Ayala, but the balance of the bullpen staff for the Yankees is just okay.

 SUMMARY: If you had any sense, you just skipped to the summary in the first place. Pete’s an idiot: the Yankees were as loaded as the Mariners–even more. Granted, the Yankees didn’t quite match the Mariners’ firepower offensively, but the Yankees’ problem wasn’t at the top of the order (the Yankees rolled out one Hall of Famer and three guys who come close), but down at the bottom (Tony Fernandez, Pat Kelly, and Mike Stanley? Anyone?). Meantime, the Yankees’ pitching was deeper and better (one Hall-of-Famer and two vote-getters), except for one inconvenient 6′ 10″ problem. 

So be warned: if you make some ill-informed statement, there’s always a chance I’ll waste hours of my life checking it out.  Anyways, looking back, it is impressive to see that six of the players on hand during the 1995 series are first ballot locks for the Hall, and 11 others get a serious look (from some, anyway): 

First Ballot Hall of Fame: Griffey, Rodriguez, Jeter, Johnson, Boggs, Rivera (3 Mariners, 3 Yankees)

Potential Hall of Fame: Edgar, Pettitte, O’Neill, Jorge Posada, Williams, Mattingly (1 Mariner, 5 Yankees)

Receiving Votes: Jay Buhner, Tino Martinez, Darryl Strawberry, Cone, McDowell (2 Mariners, 3 Yankees)

Research Day: Gas

June 5, 2007

Bear with me, Oregonian, but up here we have “Sales Tax.” The concept is this: when you buy something non-essential, a 6.5% premium is tacked on by the state and 2.3% by the local government. Unlike you, we do not have state “Income Tax.” Also, unlike you, we are forced to pump our own gas in an uncivilized fashion. But I digress.

So, say, for instance, you buy a Twinkie for $1.00 (pre-tax). This is already the worst example ever, because Twinkie is classified as “food,” but whatever: You have just injected 8.8 American cents into the local coffers for education, transit, or stop-and-start municipal dithering. (Again, I digress.) (But if you’re up here, be aware that the viaduct you’re likely to drive on or park under is subject to collapse at any moment, due to municipal decision-making paralysis.)

On the face of it, sales tax seems kinda fair–the more non-essential stuff you buy, the more tax money you pay. Well, I’m inclined to think sales tax is actually a bit regressive, which I’ll explore another time, but it’s the rule of the road in places that aren’t Oregon.

So: you pay $1.09 (they always take that extra .2 cents, like Richard Pryor in his tour de force performance in Superman 3), and the local government gets 8.8+ cents. You’ll notice that if you were to pay $2.18 for your Twinkie, then the local government gets 17.6+ cents. That’s the thing about percentages, they’re straightforward and nonjudgmental. If the Twinkie company can figure out how to get you to buy Twinkies for $10, then they get a nice healthy profit of, oh, $9.99, and local government gets a sweet 88 cent payday. Fair’s fair: sales tax is blind to the cost of the Twinkie. The government’s pie slice increases in proportion to the overall pie’s size.

At last I’m getting to the point: the other day my Conservative Adversary was lamenting the awful burden of gas taxes, which got me wondering. I dug around and here’s what I found:

In 2007, the average price per gallon for gas is, oh, $3.20. Of that $1.78 goes to purchase raw crude, $.38 goes to distribution and marketing, $.58 goes to refining costs and profits. The rest–$.46–is federal ($.18) and state (~$.28) taxes. That works out to a 14.4% tax on gas, which compares favorably to the rates elsewhere in the first world (tax per gallon rates throughout Europe vary between 50% and 70%)

So: as with the Twinkie, you’d think that the more you pay for gas, the more money is pouring into your government’s coffers, right? Maybe that knowledge helps takes a little edge off of your $50 fill-up. Except it’s not true: in the US, the tax per gallon is actually fixed ($.184 per gallon for the federal government, plus an additional amount for your state–$.28 for Washingtonians, $.24 for Oregonians).

In fact, federal fuel tax has been 18.4 cents per gallon since 1993, when the cost of gas was $1.20 per gallon (that’s a marginal rate of 15.3%in 1993, vs. a marginal rate of 5.8% today). First, imagine we simply adjusted the 18.4 cents in 1993 for inflation, we would be collecting 27 cents per gallon today: that would mean the federal government would make 9 more cents each time one of our 317 billion gallons of gas per year is sold, and would mean roughly $27 billion more per year in federal tax revenues.

And what if, like all “regular” sales taxes, gas taxes had been fixed at 15.3% in 1993? We’d be paying 30 cents more per gallon, and we’d be pulling in roughly $100 billion per year more in federal tax revenues (Funny, that’s the going rate for an occupation in Iraq.)

Okay, so any notion that federal gas tax is either high or rising is a lie. So where does this notion of gas tax burden come from? I am not sure: I checked Washington state’s gas tax history, and it’s been locked in at about 25 cents per gallon (accounted in 2005 dollars) since 1977; Oregon hasn’t increased its 24 cents per gallon in 15 years. So that’s not it.

To throw one last log on the pile, gas taxes are a hybrid kind of use tax and sin tax–tax revenues are typically poured back into transportation infrastructure, but, as President George Bush has said, we have an “addiction to oil,” so you’d think we would want to start discouraging gas use. We’re not doing anything of the kind: crude producers are making more money, refiners are making more money, distributors are making more money, consumers are paying more money, but tax revenues per gallon, since they’re fixed in 1993 dollars, are dropping like a heavy 50 pound lead rock.

Summary: I have no idea where the misconception about undue gas tax burden comes from. There is no undue gas tax burden. At a time when we are amassing a budget deficit in the hundreds of billions per year, owing in part to our oil entanglements abroad, you’d think that common sense would dictate higher fuel taxes for national security reasons.

Sources:

http://www.wikipedia.com

http://www.vtpi.org/tdm/tdm17.htm

http://www.artba.org/economics_research/reports/gas_tax_history.htm

http://www.randomuseless.info/gasprice/gasprice.html

http://www.westegg.com/inflation/

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html

http://www.eoionline.org/Taxes/GasTax0805.pdf